Abstract -
INTRODUCTION
A n extensive body of research has established the importance of both housing characteristics and location in the determination of the market value of residential properties. More recent research has attempted to assess the extent to which the package of public services available at specific locations are capitalized into the value of residential properties (Ross and Yinger, 1999) . In this paper we focus on the capitalization of public school quality. Specifically, we estimate school quality premiums after controlling for the characteristics of houses, the qualities of their neighborhoods, and the bundle of non-school public services that they receive.
The task of estimating school quality premiums is often complicated by the coincidence of school enrollment boundaries with the boundaries of incorporated political jurisdictions, such as cities, towns, and villages, that provide other important public services. Where these boundaries perfectly coincide, there is no statistical basis for separating the housing value effects associated with public schooling from those associated with other public services. Consequently, if they are to isolate the effect of school quality, researchers must find locales where at least some residences in the same political jurisdiction differ in terms of school access.
The existence of school quality premiums raises the question of what aspects of school quality are capitalized into housing prices. Previous research has paid limited attention to incorporating multiple measures of school quality in explaining housing price differentials. Our study allows for the possibility of separating elementary and secondary school effects on housing values, while previous studies have examined either elementary outputs (Bogart and Cromwell, 1997; Hayes and Taylor,1996; Black, 1999) or middle school outputs (Haurin and Brasington,1996) . Among the elementary school characteristics we assess are student body composition, student teacher ratios, and test scores. The data set we assembled for Monroe County, New York allows us to investigate whether housing values reflect not only school performance, but also the socio-economic characteristics and behavior of the students in the school, factors that have been for the most part ignored in previous research.
Several recent studies demonstrate how researchers have attempted to estimate school quality effects. William Bogart and Brian Cromwell (1997) estimated the effect of school quality and school taxes on housing values for three jurisdictions in the Cleveland metropolitan area that contain multiple school districts. Their econometric analysis suggests that school districts have a substantial impact on housing values. For example, they estimate that being in the Shaker Heights School District rather than the Cleveland School District leads to a housing value difference of between approximately 16 and 35 percent. Their subsequent study of redistricting in Shaker Heights suggests that access to neighborhood schools also has a substantial effect on prices (Bogart and Cromwell, 2000) . However, Bogart and Cromwell only purport to measure what value the housing market places on a school district, "leaving for further work what specific factors the market finds attractive " (Bogart and Cromwell, 1997, p. 219) . Hayes and Taylor (1996) looked at the effect on housing values of differences in scores on sixth grade standardized mathematics tests and gains in these test scores imputed to neighborhood schools within the Dallas Independent School District. This is one of the few studies that incorporates student body characteristics, but peer group effects are assumed to only operate through test scores, and not through any other channel that could influence housing prices. They find that within northern Dallas, the elasticity of housing values with imputed test score gain is 0.26, making it one of the most important determinants of housing values.
In an exceptionally well designed and executed study to control for neighborhood effects, Black (1999) took advantage of different enrollment areas for elementary schools within school districts by looking at residences near enrollment boundaries within 39 school districts in the Massachusetts counties of Middlesex, Essex, and Norfolk. She finds that limiting analysis to properties within about one-third mile of school boundaries leads to an estimate of approximately unitary elasticity of housing value with respect to an index of test scores based on the fourth grade Massachusetts Educational Assessment Program. While Black includes in her analysis measures of school resources, she disregards any potential direct, student peer effects.
Comparing housing values across school districts in the six largest Ohio metropolitan areas, Haurin and Brasington (1996) find a strong relationship between the percentage of students in the school district passing all parts of the Ohio ninth grade proficiency test and housing values, after controlling for a variety of other neighborhood factors. No other measures of school quality or student body characteristics are incorporated in the analysis.
The research presented here estimates the relationship between single-family owner-occupied housing values in Monroe County, New York based on a sample of sales registered in 1997. With the exception of the City of Rochester, the boundaries of school districts and political jurisdictions (towns and villages) do not exactly coincide. Additionally, the data allow the identification of grade school enrollment areas within school districts, including, most importantly, the Rochester School District, that have multiple grade schools. These non-contiguitiesimperfect correspondence of school district and political jurisdiction boundaries and grade school enrollment variation within political jurisdictions-provides leverage for isolating school quality effects. As in Bogart and Cromwell (1997) , the data thus allow the separation of the effect of public school quality from the effect of the bundle of other publically provided services offered to a residence. However, unlike Bogart and Cromwell, the impact of school quality differences on housing values are estimated directly with explicit controls for neighborhood quality, rather than being assumed as the unobserved source of housing value differentials.
As in Hayes and Taylor (1996) and Black (1999) , differential grade school access within a school district provides variation in school quality within political jurisdictions. But, unlike Hayes and Taylor, we are able to estimate school quality impacts on housing values for a sample of multiple school districts. Although our approach is unable to provide the same careful neighborhood controls utilized by Black, the unique characteristics of our data enable us to estimate differential school quality effects for residential property at all locations within the same housing market, rather than across multiple housing markets. Furthermore, our sampling design allows us to estimate school quality effects as part of the implicit tradeoffs made by households in a compact metropolitan area, which offers a full range of public service packages. Prior studies either assigned these effects as unobservables (Bogart and Cromwell, 1997) , limited their comparison to the same political jurisdiction where the trade-off between school quality and other public service levels could not be assessed (Hayes and Taylor, 1996) , or questionably pool together data from different local housing markets (Haurin and Brasington, 1996) thereby confounding potentially different price-setting mechanisms.
Our study has the additional advantage of examining school quality capitalization using a multiplicative functional form that allows for the separation of sale price into a quality-adjusted quantity and a locationally determined price of housing. The multiplicative form allows the physical characteristics of houses to be valued substantially more in some neighborhoods than in others, a feature that fits better with common perceptions of real estate markets than the standard log-linear specification.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: EXPLAINING HOUSING VALUES
A hedonic regression model for estimating the value that the market places on various attributes of residential housing has the following general form:
where SP i is the sale price of property i, X i is a vector of the physical attributes of the property, N i is the quality of the neighborhood in which the property is located, S i is a vector representing various public services provided to, and taxes levied on, the property, and ε i represents measurement error.
Variables describing the physical attributes of the property, X i , are available from assessment records. They include lot size, number of rooms, number of bathrooms, interior floor space, presence of fireplaces, garages, and porches, and the age of the structure. Our analysis uses specifications similar to those commonly employed in housing market models. In particular, we allow for the possibility that lot size, interior floor space, and structure age have quadratic relationships with sale price.
Adequately measuring the quality of the neighborhood, N i , poses a difficult problem in housing market research. Neighborhood amenities and accessability to employment and business centers are likely to affect housing values. In addition, the values of nearby properties may play a role in signaling market values to prospective buyers. Success in modeling neighborhood quality, however, has been mixed (Dubin, 1992) . The polycentric nature of the modern metropolitan area makes simple access measures, such as distance to the central business district, inappropriate. Selecting appropriate measures of neighborhood quality has proven difficult, as has defining neighborhood boundaries appropriately. Black, as discussed above, copes cleverly with this issue by exploiting the location of properties on opposite sides of school district borders. As an alternative, a number of real estate researchers have argued for dealing with neighborhood effects through explicit modeling of spatial autocorrelation rather than through the inclusion of neighborhood variables (Dubin, 1992; Can, 1992; Basu and Thibodeau, 1998; Pace et. al., 1998; and Dubin, 1998) .
In this research, to account for neighborhood quality we use the median single-family residential property value for the census tract (or block) in which the property is located as an explanatory variable. We view the median house value as the single best observable index of the market's valuation of the set of characteristics, both observable and unobservable, that define a neighborhood. It is common practice for Rochester area real estate agents to stress "comparables," the prices of nearby homes, in advising their clients about prices and bids. Our measure of neighborhood quality thus fits well with the informational processes at work in the market.
Even with the time lag between the Census (1990) and our sample (1997), it is likely that median house value for the tract or block will be correlated with the error in the housing value equation-unmeasured factors that contribute to higher median value are also likely to contribute to higher values for individual properties. Consequently, it is necessary to treat median housing value as an endogenous variable during estimation. We do so by instrumenting it with an extensive list of instrumental variables that capture neighborhood quality.
Our measurement of S i , public services and taxes, involves a partitioning into school and non-school components. The non-school component is captured by fixed effects associated with the incorporated political jurisdictions that provide local public services other than public schooling. These fixed effects represent the overall market evaluation of the bundles of these services and the local tax rates levied to provide them by jurisdictions. As residential property taxes do not operate as pure benefit taxes, town fixed effects can be either positive or negative. The school component consists of variables describing the public elementary school to which the property gives access, variables based on the averages of characteristics of public secondary schools in the school district in which the property is located, and the effective school tax millage rate levied on the property. Our primary interest is in isolating the effects of school characteristics on housing values. To allow for the possibility that we do not adequately take account of high school characteristics, we also estimate a model that, along with elementary school characteristics, includes district-level fixed effects instead of particular high school variables.
DATA AND MEASUREMENT
We implemented our study by collecting a sample of single-family house sales registered in Monroe County in 1997. Each property was then located within a political jurisdiction, school district, elementary school enrollment area, and neighborhood. Indicator variables for political jurisdictions capture the effect of the specific bundle of non-school public services and the non-school local tax. Characterizing neighborhoods and schools requires the construction of measures based on Census and school data.
Monroe County Data
Sampling was done in three stages. First, a probability sample of Monroe County housing sales was taken. Properties were randomly selected from the lists of real estate transactions published weekly in the Rochester Democrat and Chronicle during the 1997 calendar year. Only single-family residential properties with structures were kept for the sample. Second, towns that had fewer than 20 properties initially sampled were resampled to bring the total up to 20 where possible. Third, feasible combinations of towns and school districts with fewer than 20 properties were identified, and re-sampling was done to increase the number of properties within these combinations where possible. This process led to a total sample of 1,197 sales. Removing properties with lot sizes greater than 15 acres, and properties with unresolvable coding errors, left a sample of 1,193. Table 1 shows the distribution of observations by political jurisdiction and school district. Properties in the sample fall in 30 different political jurisdictions, each offering a specific bundle of public services other than education. In all, 23 different Table 2 provides summary statistics for the entire sample, and the sample divided between Rochester and suburban jurisdictions. The median (mean) sale price in the sample is $97,250 ($119,435) for all jurisdictions, $59,000 ($63,905) for the City of Rochester, and $106,000 ($128,473) for suburban jurisdictions. The median price based on all sales in Monroe county for 1997 was $102,500, somewhat higher than in the sample. The median price for all City of Rochester house sales was $54,000, somewhat lower than in the sample. (The suburban median is not available.) City properties comprised 14 percent of the sample, as compared to 24 percent of all sales, a consequence of our deliberate over-sampling of non-city sales. As there were a total of 5,179 sales in 1997, the sample comprised nearly one-quarter of all sales in that year. Table 3 provides summary data on school districts. Like many metropolitan areas, there are important differences between the school district of the central city and those of the surrounding towns. There is also considerable variation in school characteristics across suburban school districts. The variation in characteristics among school districts provides opportunities for our analytic techniques to measure capitalization effects. Even the choice of location within a district provides households the opportunity to experience different schooling levels. In two-thirds of the school districts there are multiple elementary schools. Per pupil spending by school districts ranges from just under $8,000 per enrolled student to nearly $11,700, although whether all such funds come from local resources varies greatly depending on how the specific district is treated under the state school finance formula. Differences in state education aid undoubtedly contribute to the range of variation in equalized millage rates displayed in column 4. Class size also varies across school districts, as displayed in column 5, although the variance in class size is small relative to the other school-level variables. The clearest differentiation is seen in the characteristics of the pupils attending elementary school. Children in the Rochester School District are appreciably poorer than those in the surrounding suburban districts. The percentage of students on free or reduced price lunch varies from just under 50 percent to over 100 percent across the Rochester City elementary schools. Only three suburban schools in the sample have free lunch take-up rates as high as 25 percent. Not surprisingly, academic performance also varies across and within elementary school districts. To measure differences in performance we make use of the English Language Arts (ELA) test, a newly constructed New York State Education Department instrument for gauging student language arts skills. The fourth grade ELA exam, first administered in the 1998-99 academic year, presented NYS students with a much more challenging test of their language arts capabilities than any measure available in earlier years. Publically available data include school-level average and distributional raw scores, that exhibit much greater variation across schools than the distribution of pass rates realized on the much less sophisticated state exams which were available prior to the introduction of the ELA exam. Table 3 displays the range of ELA scores by district.
Is it reasonable to assume that home buyers in Monroe County are well informed about school quality? Each year the Rochester Democrat and Chronicle publishes a report card that presents a variety of information, including test score results, for individual public and private schools and public school districts, which it distributes with the morning newspaper the day the report card appears. In 1996, an additional 18,000 copies were sold, including 2,800 copies to real estate firms and organizations that deal with employee relocation. A telephone survey of the 30 largest real estate offices found that 18 of them make use of the report cards in advising their clients about school districts (Gormley and Weimer, 1999, p. 167) . New York State also publishes each school district's report card on its State Education Department web site. The annual release of this data is featured prominently in newspapers in Monroe County as well as in the rest of the state. Furthermore, education issues are of particular salience in the Rochester area because of the publicity surrounding the implementation of an extremely generous teacher's contract approximately a decade ago. The Rochester Plan was intended to trade much greater compensation for increased teacher accountability. Although the accountability provisions of the agreement were never quite finalized, public discussion of school quality increased at the time and has since remained high. As a consequence, Rochester residents are frequently confronted with school performance data, often in the context of discussions of collective bargaining agreements and school bond votes. Indeed, the superintendent of the Rochester School District has incorporated school performance data in annual messages to taxpayers.
Measuring Neighborhood Quality
Other things equal, potential home buyers will prefer higher quality neighborhoods. The perceived quality of a neighborhood is likely to depend on physical features (such as street condition), locational factors (such as nearness to parks and major transportation routes), and the wealth of current residents. Several approaches to incorporating neighborhood effects into the housing value model could be followed. Black (1999) controls for neighborhood quality by only including properties that are locationally in the same neighborhood. This makes it unnecessary to measure neighborhood quality indirectly, but the relatively few house sales occurring in and around school district borders restricts the potential size of her sample and requires that she pool data from multiple housing markets in her study. An alternative approach attempts to identify and quantify all the major determinants of neighborhood quality. Doing so, however, poses both conceptual and data availability problems -knowing the full range of relevant neighborhood attributes and measuring them effectively. Another approach is to assume that the values of nearby houses provide a measure of neighborhood quality, one we believe to be the most appropriate given the difficulty of determining and measuring relevant neighborhood qualities and the central role of "comparables" in pricing advice real estate agents give to their clients. We follow this approach, though it requires us to address the econometric issue of endogeniety in our estimation.
Fortunately, the properties in the sample are widely distributed across neighborhoods with considerable variation in median house value-they are located in 148 different Census tracts (or blocks). For each of these tracts we have the median house value from the 1990 Census. Our assumption is that the median housing value captures all local neighborhood effects: the higher the median house value, the more desirable the neighborhood. This assumption obviates the need to specify the great variety of factors that may be relevant to neighborhood quality.
Using the median house value in our estimation, however, raises the concern that the median house value of the tract is simultaneously determined with the value of the sampled house in the tract. Even though it is likely that the median house value in the tract affects the sale price of particular properties that randomly come on the market, and that the realized sale price of these properties will not affect the median, we still face the problem that the errors in the model of housing value are likely to be correlated with errors in our measurement of neighborhood quality. Almost certainly our specification of the housing value model will leave out some variables that actually have an impact on price. For example, a house may have a higher sale price than predicted by the systematic part of the model because it is near a new playground that is valued by potential buyers. Our measure of neighborhood quality may also be affected by these excluded variables. For example, the playground may have been created since the 1990 Census, and therefore is not reflected in our measure of neighborhood quality. The econometric consequence of this likely correlation of errors will be a biased coefficient for median tract value that will spread to other coefficients through the correlation of median tract value with the other explanatory variables of housing value.
We try to reduce this bias by attempting to purge the error from our measure of neighborhood quality with instrumental variables. Specifically, we use a set of ten instruments: median household income, the percent of dwellings that are owner occupied, percent of households that are Hispanic, percent of households that are non-white, percent vacant units, percent units which are group homes, educational attainment of the median household, percent of children going to private schools, percent of households in poverty, and percent of households on public assistance. Our procedure is to regress median house value on these instruments and then use the predicted values from this regression as the measure of neighborhood quality in the housing value model.
The instruments perform well. Together they explain almost 80 percent of the variation in median housing values across Census tracts. Four of the instruments (median household income, percent nonwhite, percent owner-occupied, and median household educational achievement) are statistically significant at the 5 percent level and two (percent Hispanic and percent of units that are group homes) at the 10 percent level.
Our basic analysis uses the instrumented median house value as the control for the effect of neighborhood on sale price. Although we believe that instrumented median house value provides the best indication of neighborhood quality, as an alternative specification, we replace it with its ten instruments in the sale price equation to allow the instruments the greatest opportunity to explain variation otherwise explained by school variables. For example, one of the instruments is the median household educational attainment in the neighborhood, a variable with a .54 correlation with ELA test scores. When this instrument is included in the model, it will pick up some of the effect of the ELA score. Because the ELA score is more observable to prospective house buyers than median household education, we believe that the direct inclusion of educational attainment results in an underestimation of the effect of the ELA score. Although Black (1999) , using a different methodology to measure neighborhood quality, finds that the direct inclusion of neighborhood effects increases the size of school effects, we find that the direct inclusion of neighborhood effects reduces the measured size of school effects.
Measuring School Outcomes
We conduct our analysis using the 1998-99 English Language Arts exam, a comprehensive exam created to test the full range of language arts skills, not just those required for minimum competency. Our use of the 1998-99 ELA school average score requires us to assume that potential home buyers in 1997 could anticipate the results measured by the ELA, which was administered a year later. Thus, in using the ELA, we are trading off its higher quality as a measure of performance with the added necessity of assuming that quality remains stable in schools from year-to-year and that the qualities of schools that the ELA measures are generally known to prospective home buyers. The ELA score correlates highly (.86) with the Pupil Evaluation Program (PEP) reading test scores reported in prior years, adding to our confidence that the report cards provide a reliable measure of school quality.
Our estimation also attempts to take account of high school outputs. As far as we know, no study has attempted to take account of both elementary and high school performance in estimating housing values. Doing so, however, poses the difficulty that few high schools in Monroe County school districts have enrollment areas. Consequently, we base our estimation on school district averages rather than measures for specific high schools.
We consider three specific high school output measures in our analysis. One measure is the average percentage of students graduating with Regents diplomas over three years. The second measure of high school performance is the percentage of students earning 65 or higher on the twelfth grade English regents examination in the 1996/97 school year. The third measure is the percentage of students earning three or higher on Advanced Placement Exams at the high school level for the 1996/97 or 1997/98 school year, depending on data availability.
Non-Outcome Based School Characteristics
It is possible that parents consider other factors along with outputs in valuing schools. Parents may care about the environment in which their children are learning. One aspect of environment is the socio-economic status of the students attending schools. We thus include among school characteristics the percent of an elementary school's student body that qualifies for reduced-price lunches in the 1995/96 school year, which we cap at 100 percent for some city schools reporting higher percentages. We include a comparable measure for the high schools. To allow for the possibility that readily observable resources directly available to students are important, we include the pupil/teacher ratio for elementary schools. Finally, to capture the disciplinary environment in high schools, we include the high school suspension rate for the 1995/ 96 school year. Appendix I shows the correlation among the variables measuring school characteristics.
School Tax Values
From a theoretical perspective, the annual school tax payment associated with a property should negatively affect housing value; that is, higher taxes should be negatively capitalized when school quality is held constant. From an econometric perspective, however, we face two problems. First, sales prices (our dependent variable) affect tax payments through both the rate and assessment. Second, errors in tax payments are almost certainly correlated with errors in the assessed value of a property-the same excluded variables in our model that lead to errors in sale prices are also likely to lead to errors in assessed value (Yinger et. al., 1988) . Consequently, we expect the estimated coefficient of annual school tax payment to be biased, and in its place we use the effective mill rate as the measure of school tax burden in the estimations of the housing value model.
ESTIMATION OF HOUSING VALUE MODELS
We estimate our housing value models in two different ways. First we employ the standard log-linear model, which has been used in most prior studies:
[2] ln (SP) = Zβ + ε where SP is the sale price and Z is a vector of all the house, neighborhood, town, school, and school-tax variables.
Second, as an alternative, we consider a model that partitions the effects of variables between those that can be thought of as contributing to a quality-adjusted measure of the quantity of housing and those that can be thought of as contributing to the value of a unit of quality-adjusted housing.
Specifically, we assume a model of the following form:
[3] SP = PQe ε where SP is the recorded sale price, P is the price per unit of quality-adjusted housing, Q is the number of units of qual-ity-adjusted housing, and ε is the random error. We assume that Q = X S β S where X S includes the house characteristics listed in the first panel of Table 4 and that P = X L β L where X L includes all the location-related characteristics listed in the neighborhood, town, elementary school, high school, and school tax panels of Table 4 . P is a price index that differentially values housing characteristics at different locations.
Taking the natural log of both sides of [4] yields:
Assuming ε is normally distributed, we find maximum likelihood estimates for β S and β L . These estimates are presented in the last two columns of Table 4 . (The R 2 is calculated as the square of the correlation between the log of sale price and log of predicted sale price to make it comparable to the log-linear specification.) Table 4 presents estimations of alternative specifications of the log-linear model and multiplicative models. The specifications differ in the way in which we control for neighborhood and high school effects. As our primary concern is the effect of elementary school variables on housing values, we estimate standard errors using the Huber-White correction for clustering of observations within elementary school enrollment areas. (The statistical interpretations that result are almost identical to those obtained using standard errors from an ordinary least squares regression.) Each specification explains approximately 80 percent of the sample variation of the natural log of sale price, the dependent variable.
The panel labeled "House Characteristics" in Table 4 presents estimates of coefficients for characteristics of properties. With only three exceptions, all of the coefficients are statistically significant (at the 5 percent level) and in the predicted direction. The presence of a swimming pool has a positive, but generally statistically insignificant, effect on housing value, not surprising in a locale whose climate offers a very short outdoor swimming season. The number of bedrooms has a negative, but statistically insignificant, effect, perhaps because, after controlling for living space, more bedrooms means smaller rooms. Similarly, the presence of an enclosed porch has a negative, but statistically insignificant, effect, again perhaps reflecting that households generally prefer living space in other forms.
The quadratic effects of living space, lot size, and age of structure have the following interpretations in terms of their marginal effects in the log-linear (multiplicative) model with full school effects and the instrumented neighborhood effect displayed in column two (5): As living space increases up to 8,100 (8,130) square feet, which is well above the largest square footage in the sample, housing value increases but at a decreasing rate. As lot size increases up to 6.33 (6.25) acres, housing value increases but at a decreasing rate; beyond this lot size, housing value declines with further increases. As the age of the structure increases up to 108 (113) years, housing value decreases; beyond this age housing value rises with greater age.
Although the substantive impacts of the house characteristics differ somewhat between the log-linear and multiplicative models, they have quite plausible magnitudes. For example, in the log-linear model a fireplace adds $9,300 and an additional bathroom adds $5,900, to a house with the median county value of $102,500. In the multiplicative model, the value of these features depends on the locational price index. (See Table 5 .) When the index equals 1, a fireplace adds $7,000 and an additional bathroom adds about $5,700. When the index equals 1.19, the suburban mean, then the fireplace adds $7,900 and an additional bathroom adds $6,400. When the index equals .83, the city mean, then a fireplace adds $5,800 and an addi- tional bathroom adds $4,700. The multiplicative model thus allows housing characteristics to have differential marginal effects on housing sale price depending upon location of the property-an advantage of this specification over the log-linear form.
The panels of Table 4 labeled "Town Fixed Effects," "Elementary School Characteristics," "High School/District Characteristics," and "School Tax," show the effects of alternative model specifications. Column two presents the fully specified log-linear model containing the neighborhood instrument as well as variables for housing characteristics, town fixed effects, elementary and high school characteristics, and effective school tax rate. It shows substantively large and statistically significant coefficients for ELA score and the percent of elementary school students qualifying for reduced price lunch. A comparison with column one shows the implications of excluding the reduced price lunch variable from the list of elementary school characteristics-the ELA coefficient rises by 30 percent, establishing the importance of including the free lunch variable in the estimating equation.
Column three replaces the instrumented neighborhood measure with its ten instrumental variables. The coefficients for average ELA score and reduced price lunch keep their signs, but lose their statistical significance. This loss of significance is not surprising, as the ten instruments explain 63 percent of the variation in ELA scores and 72 percent of the variation in reduced price lunch. Only four of the instruments have statistically significant coefficients at the 10 percent level, as opposed to six in the instrumenting equation. Nevertheless, the loss of significance of the coefficient of the ELA test score in this model raises the possibility that the available data does not allow for a clear separation of school and neighborhood effects.
Neither method of dealing with neighborhood quality provides a set of plausible estimates for the high school characteristics. In each specification, reduced price lunch has a statistically significant sign in an unexpected direction. In the model with the neighborhood instrument, only suspension rate is statistically significant with the expected negative sign. In the model that includes the instruments, only graduation rate and advanced placement have statistically significant coefficients, with only the former having the expected sign. These mixed results suggest that the models may not have the right set of high school characteristics, or our use of school district average high school characteristics is muddying the picture. Consequently, as an alternative specification, the model presented in column four replaces all the high school characteristics and the effective school tax with fixed effects for school districts.
The results for the model with fixed school district effects is shown in column 4. All the school district and town effects are measured relative to Rochester. The uniformly positive coefficients for school districts indicate, other things equal, that sale prices are higher in the suburban school districts than in the Rochester School District. In contrast, the uniformly negative coefficients for towns indicate that, other than schools, the public services provided by towns are negatively capitalized into sale prices. Note the striking contrast to the other specifications where all the town effects are positive. It thus appears that if school quality were equal, house buyers would pay a premium to live in the central city.
Relative to the model with high school characteristics, the model with school district fixed effects results in a larger estimate of the coefficient of ELA score but a statistically insignificant negative coefficient of smaller magnitude for reduced price lunch. Nevertheless, if reduced price lunch is removed from the equation (not shown), the ELA score coefficient increases by over 15 percent.
Column five presents the multiplicative model with full school effects and the neighborhood instrument. As with the parallel log-linear model in column 2, it shows a statistically significant coefficient for average ELA score. Replacing the instrumented neighborhood measure with its ten instruments in column 6 reduces the size of the coefficient of the average ELA score; as in the log-linear model, it loses statistical significance. Only two of the instruments have statistically significant coefficients.
The school district fixed effects specification is shown in column 7. As with the log-linear specification using school district fixed effects, the district effects are positive relative to Rochester while the town effects are negative relative to Rochester.
EFFECTS OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOL QUALITY ON THE CITY TAX BASE
The coefficient for the average ELA score provides a basis for gauging the magnitude of elementary school output improvements on city housing values. Several caveats, however, must be kept in mind. First, our predictions are based on a partial, rather than general, equilibrium analysis. If city schools were to be improved so that city housing values rose, then city house buyers on average would likely be wealthier than now and suburban house buyers would likely be on average poorer than now. This might depress suburban housing values, thus moderating somewhat the increase in city house values. Second, our model uses ELA scores as a proxy for all elementary school outputs. If there were substantial "teaching to the test" that did not spill over to other school outputs, then our predictions based on ELA improvements will be overly optimistic. Third, our model does not allow us to estimate confidently the capitalization effect of school taxes. Our predicted impact of school improvements on housing values are best interpreted as stemming from a more efficient use of existing school resources.
In order to investigate the responsiveness of the city tax base to changes in ELA scores using the log-linear model we first change ELA scores for the city properties in our sample. Then, assuming that the errors in the estimated model are normally distributed, we predict a new city mean housing value by averaging the expected values of value over the N city houses in the sample using the following formula: [5] where sp i is the sale price and µ i is the predicted natural log of sale price, and λ i 2 is the variance of the prediction of µ i . To implement the formula, we estimate µ i using the coefficients from the model and the characteristics of the i th property and we use the standard deviation of the prediction of µ i as λ i .
To use the multiplicative model to predict the responsiveness of the city tax base to changes in ELA scores we calculate the new locational price indexes that result
from increasing ELA scores. We then predict sales prices by multiplying the original quality-adjusted housing quantity index for each property by its new locational price index and averaging over the city sample. Table 6 summarizes predictions of the impact of changes in average ELA scores on Rochester housing values, assuming suburban scores do not change. The upper panel sets out predictions of average housing values under six alternative model specifications corresponding to columns 2 through 7 in Table 4 . The basecase predictions range from $59,102 for the multiplicative model with fixed effects to $62,465 for the log-linear model with direct inclusion of neighborhood instruments.
The lower panel of Table 6 shows the percentage increase in the average value of city housing that results from various increases in average ELA scores. The first row of this panel shows the impact of increasing the average ELA score for each city school by 1 percent. The resulting percentage increases in housing values are quite large. They range from 0.6 percent for the log-linear model with direct inclusion of instruments to 4.7 percent for the log-linear model with the instrumented neighborhood variable and school district fixed effects. That is, the elasticity of city housing values with respect to average ELA score ranges from 0.6 to 4.7 in these models.
Rows two and three of the panel show the impacts of raising average ELA scores in the lowest scoring schools. Row two shows the impact of moving each school below the city school mean of 629.6 up to 629.6, leaving average scores in schools above the city mean unchanged. This change increases average housing values from between 0.3 and 2.8 percent. Moving all city schools up to the county mean of 650.7 raises the average housing values by between 1.7 and 14.9 percent. Rows four and five of the panel raise average ELA scores in all city schools by one (11.1 points) and two (22.2 points) standard deviations, respectively. The one standard deviation increase raises average city housing values by between 1.0 and 8.3 percent; the two standard deviation increase raises average city housing values by between 2.0 and 17.4 percent.
Overall, these results indicate that average ELA score has a large substantive significance. Even relatively small changes in ELA scores seem to have noticeable effects on city housing values. These results have obvious implications for the fiscal capacity of the city: improvements in the quality of city elementary schools appear to have potential for inducing large increases in the city's tax base.
One way that average ELA scores could be improved would be for city schools to make more effective use of available resources. Another way would be to raise taxes to provide more resources to schools. However, higher taxes would be capitalized into lower housing values. We investigate these offsetting capitalization effects by analyzing what size tax increase could be accommodated to generate a 1 percent change in ELA scores, without changing the size of the tax base. The multiplicative model with the instrumented neighborhood measure indicates that a 48 percent increase in the effective tax rate would be neutral with respect to the residential tax base; the multiplicative model with the neighborhood instruments indicates a residential tax-base neutral increase of 97 percent. As the City of Rochester is responsible, under current State law, for approximately 37 percent of the costs of running public schools, these results imply increased school spending in the range of 17 to 34 percent per pupil. However, because of the imprecision of the coefficient estimates of the effective tax rate, these estimates should be taken as merely suggestive that the market reveals a high willingness-to-pay for improvements in educational outcomes. Finally, the strong elementary school effect has implications for predicting the impact of greater educational choice on the city tax base. Imagine a fully implemented voucher plan that effectively separated the choice of publicly-funded schooling from residential choice. If it had the effect of giving all city residences convenient access to schools with the mean ELA score for the county, then the multiplicative model results presented in Table  6 would suggest an increase in the city's residential tax base of between 4.9 and 14.4 percent. This potentially large fiscal effect on central cities is rarely noted in analyses of the impact of educational vouchers.
CONCLUSION
Our analysis of housing values in Monroe County confirms the importance of elementary school outputs, even after controlling for student body composition, high school characteristics, and other public services. It is worth noting that the exclusion of the fraction of the student body participating in the free lunch program, the common measure of the socioeconomic standing of the student body, results in substantially larger coefficients for elementary school test scores. This suggests the importance of including such variables in school quality capitalization studies. Although our research design gives us the potential to identify the capitalization of high school as well as elementary school characteristics, the pattern of coefficients for high school characteristics and school tax rates suggests that our data may not have allowed us to separate out their effects reliably. Nevertheless, the strong effect of elementary school test scores remains when these variables are replaced by fixed effects for school districts.
The analysis employed a multiplicative functional form as well as the standard log-linear form. Although the main results remained consistent between the models, the multiplicative form is relatively attractive in that it allows for substantially different valuations of housing characteristics across locations. Our analysis demonstrates the feasibility of using this more conceptually appropriate functional form.
Our substantive results indicate that in a market in which a central city has relatively lower housing values than surrounding suburbs, central city housing values are highly elastic with respect to improvements in elementary school quality. Improving elementary schools in these central cities thus has large potential for increasing housing values and thus revenues from real property taxes. 
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